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Abstract
This paper investigates the accession-related economic boom in the countries
which recently entered the European Union. The analysis tests whether, on top
of the standard growth determinants, the period of EU accession made a signi￿-
cant di⁄erence to the growth performance of the New Member States (NMS). The
paper ￿nds that the period of EU accession is characterised by signi￿cantly larger
growth rates of per-capita GDP, even after controlling for a wide range of economic
and institutional factors. This e⁄ect is robust and particularly strong for coun-
tries with relatively low initial income levels, weak institutional quality and less
advanced ￿nancial development, suggesting that EU accession has been speeding
up the catching-up process and improved the institutions of the laggards among
the NMS. The prospect of EU membership which has triggered large capital in￿ ows
seems to have fostered economic growth of those NMS with lower degrees of ￿nancial
depth.
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The economic growth record of the New Member States (NMS) of the European Union
after the recovery form transition in the early 1990s has been impressive. The region is
widely believed to have bene￿ted from catching-up dynamics as well as economic and
institutional integration with the EU. However, the debate is open regarding the degree
to which EU integration mattered for catching up and through which channels.
While the empirical growth literature is extensive, only a few studies have used
growth regressions to analyse the impact of EU accession on growth. Crespo-Cuaresma
et al. (2002) make explicit reference to EU membership in explaining growth, analysing
pre-2004 accessions and ￿nding the length of EU membership to have a signi￿cantly
positive e⁄ect on economic growth. Schadler et al. (2006) analyse the growth experience
of the NMS and other emerging market countries and ￿nd that income levels, population
growth, investment, openness and institutional quality determine growth. Falcetti et al.
(2006) and Iradian (2007) focus on the growth experience of transition countries and
￿nd a signi￿cant impact of institutional factors and transition reforms, as well as a
signi￿cant impact of recovery from transition-related output losses. CihÆk and Fonteyne
(2009) conduct a cross-section growth regression augmented by a NMS dummy variable
and ￿nd that economic growth in NMS exceeded that of their remaining sample of
developed and developing countries.
We make a step forward compared with the existing literature in two respects. First,
we assess the impact of EU accession on the growth performance of NMS in a panel
analysis after controlling for a series of institutional factors. This way, we check whether,
on top of facilitating institutional convergence, and therefore growth, the prospect of
EU accession had an additional signi￿cant impact per se. Second, we investigate which
factors appear to be associated with stronger growth-enhancing e⁄ects of EU accession,
testing in particular the e⁄ects of initial income levels, institutional quality and ￿nancial
2development in conjunction with the growth experience of the NMS during the accession
stage.
This paper employs a large cross-country dataset to dispose of a signi￿cant control
group. The panel dataset comprises annual observations of advanced, emerging, and
transition economies starting in 1960. In addition to the standard determinants per-
capita GDP, population growth, investment, openness and human capital formation, we
also include variables related to economic transition and EU integration, namely initial
output loss, terms-of-trade growth and institutional quality of the legal system, freedom
of trade, and the regulatory environment. The role of institutional quality for growth is
stressed, for example, by Acemoglu et al. (2005). Controlling for all these e⁄ects, the
additional EU accession impact is measured in a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach. The
interaction of an accession time dummy with a NMS region dummy permits to assess
whether the prospect of EU accession a⁄ected the growth rate of NMS, relative to the
pre-accession period and to the old EU-15 member states (OMS).
The results suggest a signi￿cant EU accession e⁄ect on top of the impact of the re-
maining explanatory variables. While the NMS growth rates appear signi￿cantly lower
than those of the OMS during the transition period of the early 1990s, the NMS perform
signi￿cantly better than the OMS during the EU accession period, as compared to the
1994-99 reference period. The results are basically robust with respect of the de￿nition
of the sample. Potential endogeneity of investment as an explanatory variable is ad-
dressed by using initial sub-period values and the relative price of investment in a set of
instrumental variable regressions.
Interacting the "accession dummy" with various explanatory variables, it is found
that the growth e⁄ect during the accession period was particularly strong for those NMS
with relatively low initial income levels, weak institutional quality and lower degrees of
￿nancial development. EU accession seems to have had a fast-track convergence e⁄ect
particularly on the economic laggards among the NMS. Furthermore, accession is likely
3to have improved institutional quality, further supporting the growth in the NMS. By
triggering ￿nancial in￿ ows and the reconstruction of the banking system, the prospect
of accession may have fostered growth in those NMS with weak ￿nancial depth.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some stylised
facts, highlighting the growth performance of the NMS over time and investigating signs
of convergence graphically. Section 3 explains the data, methodology and results of
various growth regression speci￿cations to investigate growth e⁄ects of EU accession.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Stylised facts
The growth performance of the NMS has been described as a typical catching-up expe-
rience, starting from lower initial per-capita income levels and characterised by higher
average growth rates than the mature economies of the OMS.
NMS growth rates have been volatile, yet mostly above those of the OMS and other
mature economies. Graphs 1 and 2 show the growth rates of the ten transition NMS. The
Baltics as well as Bulgaria and Romania appear to be strongly a⁄ected by the aftermath
of the Russian economic crisis of 1998 but exhibit elevated growth rates between 2000
and 2007. Growth rates for the remaining NMS were somewhat lower, ￿ uctuating around
6-7%. In 2008, growth rates generally slumped in the wake of the global ￿nancial crisis.
[Graphs 1 and 2]
Catching-up dynamics ("beta convergence") are illustrated in Graph 3 which shows
that the average annual per-capita growth rates of those EU countries with lower initial-
year income levels (1996) tend to exhibit higher growth rates, indicated by a downward-
sloping trend line.1 The NMS are clearly concentrated in the top-left quadrant of the
1The concept of catching-up convergence stems from the convergence hypothesis of the neoclassical
growth literature. A Solow-type production function with non-increasing returns to scale typically implies
that the long-term behaviour of the economy will be independent of the initial conditions. Due to the
concavity of the production function in the capital stock, capital-poor countries will grow su¢ ciently
4graph, notably the Baltic countries. Some NMS like Slovenia and the Czech Republic,
however, are located not far from OMS countries such as Portugal and Greece. The
graph con￿rms the widely agreed conclusion that regards the EU as a "convergence
club" (see Schadler et al. (2006)).
[Graphs 3 and 4]
Sigma convergence is an alternative way of assessing income convergence, i.e. the
decrease of cross-country variation of growth rates over time. The NMS have made
considerable progress since the beginning of the decade. Graph 4 shows the standard
deviation of national per-capita growth rates, in percent of the average. In contrast
to the notion of the EU as a "convergence club", sigma convergence is mostly due to
developments in the NMS. While the cross-country variation of growth rates among the
OMS remained largely stable over time, that of the NMS declined continuously since
2000.
The role of institutional quality is increasingly at the core of growth theory. Graph 5
shows the Fraser Institute￿ s index for the quality of the legal system, ranging from 1 for
poor to 10 for optimal systems of legal protection and property rights (see Gwartney and
Lawson (2009)). Comparing 1999 to 2005 shows that a majority of NMS, and notably the
Baltic countries as well as Cyprus clearly improved their legal system quality. Hungary,
Slovenia and Poland, however, appear to have deteriorated in terms of legal system
quality. The indices of the other NMS have not changed much over time.
[Graph 5]
Taken together, the descriptive evidence suggests that catching-up dynamics were at
work in most NMS. Several key drivers of economic growth, however, point at impor-
tant cross-country di⁄erences. The Baltic countries exhibit particularly strong growth
rates in the presence of comparably low initial income levels and large improvements in
faster, i.e. catch up to the capital-rich countries to o⁄set the initial di⁄erences. Catching up is subject
to alternative possible factors, including structural transformation, endogenous growth and gains from
trade (see Caselli and Tenreyro (2005)).
5institutional quality. The aim of the regression analysis in the following section is to
shed light on the role of EU accession on top of standard growth determinants and to
identify potential channels of this e⁄ect.
3 Assessing the EU accession boom
3.1 Data and methodology
To carry out panel regressions, a large cross-country dataset is used to dispose of a
signi￿cant control group. The dataset comprises annual observations of 62 advanced,
emerging, and transition economies from 1960 to 2008.2 Besides the 27 EU member
states and the remaining 11 OECD countries, 24 additional middle-income countries
are considered.3 Explanatory variables include standard growth determinants, namely
per-capita GDP, population growth, investment, openness, terms-of-trade growth and
human capital formation.4 This baseline growth regression speci￿cation is augmented
to take into account explanatory factors speci￿c to the growth performance of transition
and NMS. To control for the impact of changing terms of trade following transition-
related structural change and developments in world commodity prices, terms of trade
changes are included among the set of explanatory variables (Iradian (2007)). To account
for catching-up e⁄ects after the output break-downs of formerly communist countries in
the early 1990s, an output loss variable is constructed as the ratio of current output
to the average output during 1990-1995 (akin to Falcetti et al. (2006) and Iradian
2Due to uncertainty about data accuracy, observations of formerly-communist countries prior to 1990
are excluded.
3The countries included in the sample were as follows: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, P.R.:Hong Kong, China,P.R.: Mainland, Colom-
bia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Indonesia, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mo-
rocco, Mexico, Macedonia: FYR, Malta, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay.
4See, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Levine and Renelt (1992), and Temple (1999), for an
overview of explanatory variables in empirical growth analysis.
6(2007)). Furthermore, in light of the shaping view that institutions are key to the
development process (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2005)), and in line with recent analogous
analyses on growth in transition economies and NMS, standard speci￿cations of growth
regressions are augmented with the inclusion of various indicators are employed to proxy
for the institutional quality of the legal system, freedom of trade, and the regulatory
environment.
The data on real per-capita GDP in PPP terms, investment and openness ratios are
provided by the Penn World Tables. Population growth and terms of trade are taken
from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators (WDI) while the source of the
human capital variable (average years of schooling for the whole population) is Barro and
Lee (2000) and the source of the indices on institutional quality is the Fraser Institute.5
Following standard practice in the estimation of growth regressions, annual observa-
tions are converted into averages over ￿ve-year, non-overlapping sub-periods, in order to
avoid that short-term disturbances a⁄ect results.6 Dummy variables capture the idio-
syncratic e⁄ects of time periods and of geographic regions. The interaction between
time and geographical e⁄ects permits to assess whether a particular group of countries
performed above the control country group and time period in a particular period of
time. Although accession of the EU-10 was formally completed as of 1 May 2004 (that
of Bulgaria and Romania as of 1 January 2007), there is agreement that much of the
accession-related growth e⁄ects took place already before the o¢ cial dates, in light of the
economic and institutional restructuring associated with the achievement of the ￿ acquis
communautaire￿ , EU transfers related to accession, and sizable investment, FDI, and
technology transfer in anticipation of EU accession (e.g., Schadler et al. (2006)). Hence,
5These indicators permit to capture major transition-related and accession-related elements, including
change in ownership of ￿nancial and non-￿nancial ￿rms and protection and enforcement of property
rights. Compared with the EBRD transition indicators (used, for instance, in Falcetti et al., 2006), they
are available also for non-transition countries. Compared with the World Bank Governance Indicators
(used, e.g., in Iradian (2007)), they are available for a longer time period.
6Due to missing data for several variables for the 2007-2009 period, the last sub-period includes the
available years between 2005 and 2009.
7the interactions of the 2000-04 and the post-2005 dummies with a NMS dummy are used
to assess whether accession a⁄ected the growth rate of the NMS on top of the impact of




Basic speci￿cations provide a satisfactory performance, presented in Table 1. Spec-
i￿cation (1) includes standard growth regression variables used to assess conditional
convergence in large cross-country datasets. Per-capita GDP growth is regressed on the
initial sub-period values of the log of per-capita GDP as well as on population growth,
investment ratios, openness, and the human capital proxy variable.
[Table 1]
The coe¢ cients are signi￿cant and show the expected signs, with the exception of
population growth, the signi￿cance level of which falls below the 10 percent threshold.
Human capital variables, however, are either not available for most of the NMS (Barro
and Lee data), or available for only some NMS, and few years (WDI). Hence, to keep a
su¢ ciently large amount of data on NMS, the baseline regressions to assess the impact
of accession exclude human capital variables. Of course, as a result of the exclusion of a
largely signi￿cant explanatory variable, an omitted variable bias issue arises. However,
as shown in speci￿cation (2), which is based on the same sample as (1) but excludes the
schooling variable, it appears that the bulk of the bias is found in the coe¢ cient of initial
income per capita (omitting the human capital variable leads to an underestimation of
the speed of convergence), while the performance of the remaining explanatory factors
is fairly robust.
7In all regressions, the omitted regional dummy is that for the OMS, the omitted period dummy is
the 1995-1999 period. Hence, the non-omitted region and time dummies represent the di⁄erence to the
OMS and with respect to the 1995-1999 period.
8The baseline speci￿cation is augmented to take into account NMS-speci￿c growth
determinants and institutional factors. Speci￿cations (3) and (4) employ the maximum
available samples and supplement the regression with relevant additional control vari-
ables to test the impact of accession on the NMS. In line with expectations, the NMS
perform sign￿cantly worse during the 1990-94 period and signi￿cantly better in 2000-04
and post-2005, relative to the omitted reference period 1995-99 and the control group of
OMS. The size and signi￿cance level of the coe¢ cients for the 2000-04 period are both
larger than in the post-2005 period, indicating that the bulk of the accession e⁄ect could
have materialised already in the run up to the o¢ cial date of accession.8
Speci￿cation (4) includes in addition the output loss variable as well as the three
institutional indicators, measuring the quality of the legal system, freedom of trade
and the quality of regulation in product, labour and ￿nancial markets. The coe¢ cient of
output loss is positive but not signi￿cant. The three institutional variables are positively
associated with growth although only freedom of trade is signi￿cant at the 5 percent
level. As a result of the inclusion of the institutional variables, the impact of accession
shrinks somewhat in magnitude, suggesting that improvements in institutional quality
themselves were associated with the accession process. The coe¢ cients of population
growth and terms of trade growth turn signi￿cant on the 10 percent level with the
inclusion of the institutional quality variables.
For some countries actual growth rates diverged quite considerably from the predic-
tion of the empirical model as illustrated by Graph 6. The graph plots the actual and
predicted average growth rates over the three 5-year periods between 1995 and 2009
8The di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach quanti￿es the e⁄ect of the di⁄erence in time periods and coun-
try groups. The accession dummy "NMS during 2000-2004" therefore refers to the di⁄erence between the
accession period (2000-04) and the reference period (1994-99) for the NMS, minus the same di⁄erence
for the OMS, controling for other factors. The actual average growth rates were as follows.
Average growth rates of real per-capita GDP, in %
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 post-2005
NMS -3.4 3.6 4.9 2.7
OMS 1.3 3.1 2.1 0.3
9for the transition NMS based on speci￿cation (4) of Table 1. The actual growth rates
exceed model-predicted rates in several countries, most notably in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania and during the accession period (2000-2004). A detailed analysis of the fac-
tors driving growth in the Baltics is provided by the European Commission (2009b) and
Lendvai and Roeger (2009).
[Graph 6]
Regression results appear to be robust with respect to the de￿nition of the sample.
Speci￿cation (5) focuses on the post-1990 period, yielding a more balanced panel. The
emerging picture is broadly similar to that of the baseline speci￿cation. Terms of trade
growth seems less relevant as a driver of growth while the positive accession impact for
the NMS during the 2000-04 and the post-2005 periods are still signi￿cant.
Finally, speci￿cation (6) repeats the speci￿cation in (5) but restricting the sample to
transition economies. In spite of the limited number of observations, this check permits to
obtain a further control for transition-related factors. Not surprisingly, the coe¢ cient of
initial per capita GDP is larger than in the full country sample, due to stronger catching-
up e⁄ects in transition economies. However, the explanatory power of investment ratios
is lower, a phenomenon common to previous studies, which re￿ ects over-capitalisation
of previously planned economies and capital scrapping during transition. Institutional
quality appears to have played a more prominent role, highlighted by the signi￿cance
of now two out of three institutional indexes, namely legal system quality and freedom
of trade. Also the size of the coe¢ cients is larger, pointing at stronger growth e⁄ects
of good institutions in transition economies. The NMS dummies are not signi￿cant,
except when interacted with the 1990-94 period. A possible interpretation of this result
is that, during the reference period (1995-99), growth in the NMS was higher than
in other transition economies at that time which may have been more a⁄ected by the
Russian crisis of the late 1990s.9 In the early 2000s, however, growth was strong in both
9Indeed, actual growth rates of real per-capita GDP were larger in the NMS in 1995-99 than in the
10country groups. For comparison, regression speci￿cation (7) employs the period 1990-94
as baseline, showing a large and signi￿cant positive coe¢ cient of the NMS*(1995-94)
interaction term. Compared to the transition recession period in the early 1990s, the
NMS grew signi￿cantly faster in the late 1990s than the other transition countries.
During the period of anticipated accession in the early 2000s, the NMS interaction term
is borderline signi￿cant, indicating that growth in the NMS was stronger as compared
to the other transition countries, relative to the early 1990s.
An important robustness issue in growth regressions pertains to the possible en-
dogeneity of explanatory variables. Most notably the investment ratio is likely to be
subject to endogeneity, given that investment not only favours growth but growth also
tends to boost savings and thus investment, see e.g. Carroll and Weil (1994). One pop-
ular strategy to account for simultaneity of investment suggests using initial values of
sub-periods, see Temple (1999). Alternatively, it has been suggested to use the relative
price of investment goods as proxy and instrumental variables.10 Table 2 presents spec-
i￿cations aimed at checking robustness of the baseline regression speci￿cations (4) and
(5) in Table 1 with respect to possible endogeneity of the investment variable.
[Table 2]
The ￿rst two columns of Table 2 use the initial sub-period values of the investment
ratio rather than the average. Columns (3) and (4) replace the investment ratio by the
relative price of investment as a proxy variable. The last two columns report instrumental
variable regression results, using initial sub-period investment as well as the relative
investment price to instrument the investment ratio. All three approaches yield very
similar results and underscore the robustness of the estimates. The relative price of
other transition countries.
Average growth rates of real per-capita GDP, in %
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 post-2005
New member states -3.4 3.6 4.9 2.7
Other transition economies -4.5 2.5 7 5.5
10See Schadler et al. (2006). Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) show that the relative price of investment is
a more robust and less endogenous determinant of growth than the investment ratio.
11investment delivers the expected negative, signi￿cant coe¢ cents. Population growth
and output loss turn signi￿cant in most speci￿cations. The ￿rst-stage coe¢ cients of
the IV estimations are highly signi￿cant and the F test statistics are above the critical
values, indicating no weak instrument problem. Table A.1 in the Annex reports further
robustness results, using initial values in OLS and IV regressions also for the other
explanatory variables (akin to Rousseau and Wachtel (2009)). The results are largely
con￿rmed.
3.2.2 What did contribute to growth e⁄ects of EU accession?
To shed light on the channels through which the accession e⁄ect may have in￿ uenced
economic growth, Table 3 presents regression results with interaction terms. The ac-
cession dummy, i.e. the dummy for the NMS during the period 2000-04, is interacted
with three alternative variables for the full sample as well as the transition-country sub-
sample.11 For the full sample, the IV speci￿cation (5) of Table 2 is applied while, for
the transition countries, the small number of observation restricts the method to OLS.
Speci￿cation (1) tests the combined impact of initial per capita GDP and accession,
￿nding a strongly signi￿cant and negative coe¢ cient. The result is very similar when
the post-1990 sample is applied, see speci￿cation (2). Hence, the catching-up e⁄ect is
even stronger for the NMS during the accession period than otherwise. EU accession
appears to have helped in speeding up the catching up process, possibly via technology
transfer through increased trade and FDI in￿ ows. Indeed, technological growth as re-
￿ ected by total factor productivity has been shown to be a major driving force in the
NMS (CihÆk and Fonteyne (2009)). Increased labour mobility and migration may also
have played a role in speeding up the convergence process, boosting capital-labour ratios
and supporting aggregate demand through remittances (IMF (2008)).
11Each of the three variables is standardised to mean zero and standard deviation of one before creating
the interaction terms to facilitate the interpretation of coe¢ cients.
12[Table 3]
Speci￿cations (3) and (4) interact the enlargment dummy with an institutional in-
dex, namely the quality of the legal system. Coe¢ cinents for both samples indicate a
signi￿cant negative impact of the interaction term, suggesting that a weaker legal system
quality is associated with a larger growth gain of accession. A possible interpretation is
that EU accession led to institutional catching up and then to increasing growth which is
not captured by the Fraser indexes of institutional quality. The positive incentive e⁄ect
of EU membership on institutional development has been demostrated empirically by
Belke et al. (2009) and Di Tommaso et al. (2007).
Finally, the last two columns of Table 3 include the ratio of private credit to GDP as
a measure of ￿nancial development and interact this variable with the accession dummy.
The interaction coe¢ cients turn out to be signi￿cant and negative in both samples, im-
plying that a country with a low degree of ￿nancial development bene￿ted more from
EU accession in terms of economic growth.12 In the NMS, ￿nancial sector development
went hand in hand with overall economic transition and eventual EU accession. Initiated
by extensive bank restructuring and privatisation as well as sizable FDI in￿ ows, ￿nan-
cial depth in the NMS increased markedly since the mid-1990s (European Commission
(2009a)). Notably the Baltic countries as well as Bulgaria and Romania, having started
with less advanced ￿nancial development and experienced boosting capital in￿ ow and
credit ratios thereafter, also exhibited the highest growth rates of real per-capita GDP
during the EU accession period. Recent ￿nancial market turbulences have, however,
revealed the substantial risks entailed in this development.
Financial development and advances in institutional quality have also been found to
be intertwined. Kose et al. (2006) argue that the growth e⁄ects of ￿nancial development
and integration are partly, if not mainly, in￿ uenced by institutional quality. In turn,
12Employing the ratio of liquid liabilites (M3) to GDP as an alternative measure of ￿nancial devel-
opment leads to very similar results. Rousseau and Wachtel (2009) examine the impact of ￿nancial
development on growth in more depth.
13￿nancial liberalisation can impose discipline on macroeconomic policies and thereby
lead to an improved institutional environment.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigates the growth performance of the NMS in the context of the EU
accession boom. Based on a large cross-country dataset, panel regressions test for stan-
dard growth determinants as well as accession-related variables. The analysis ￿nds that,
on average, the accession period was characterised by an overall positive growth expe-
rience for the NMS, on top of the e⁄ects of other explanatory variables. Interestingly,
this positive e⁄ect remains signi￿cant even after controlling for institutional factors that
are possibly related to accession, such as freedom of trade and the quality of the legal
and regulatory system. This suggests that TFP growth improvements associated with
accession-related factors, like FDI and technology transfer, improved resource allocation
and governance associated with ￿nancial integration, could have played a relevant role.
Growth in the Baltic countries was particularly strong and exceeds model predictions
for the early 2000s but falls short in the second half of the decade. The European Com-
mission (2009b) as well as Lendvai and Roeger (2009) provide detailed analysis on the
experience of the Baltics.
The regression results are robust to changes in the sample and estimation method.
Restricting the sample to post-1990 observations delivers very simliar result. Comparing
the NMS to the other transition countries in the sample indicates a positive, borderline-
signi￿cant growth e⁄ect during the accession period for the NMS when the early 1990s
are used as reference period.
To investigate potential channels of the growth impact of EU accession, various
variables are interacted with the accession dummy. It is shown that countries with lower
initial income levels, weaker institutional quality and less advanced ￿nancial development
14bene￿ted more strongly from EU accession in terms of economic growth. As expected,
accession seems to have sped up the catching up process and improved the institutions in
the laggards among the NMS. By triggering capital in￿ ows, the prospect of EU accession
is also likely to have improved economic growth for those NMS with lower degrees of
￿nanical depth.
The present analysis is a ￿rst step to understand the mechanisms underlying the
positive factors of economic growthe e⁄ects during the EU accession process. For future
research it would be useful employing also micro-level evidence to further investigate the
driving forces of accession-related growth e⁄ects in the NMS.
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Note: Annual growth rates of per-capita GDP (PPP). Source: AMECO database.
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Note: Income levels and growth rates are based on real per-capita GDP in PPP terms.
Source: Elaborations on the AMECO database.
























Note: Larger indices indicate higher quality of the legal system. Source: Fraser Insti-
tute.











































































































































































































































Notes: Actual average annual growth rates are compared to model predictions, based
on the baseline regression speci￿cation (4) in table 1. Source: AMECO database. Figures
for 2009 are based on forecasts.
20Table 1: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample Full Full Full Full Post-1990 Transition Transition
Log initial GDP per capita -1.87*** -1.62*** -1.62*** -2.03*** -1.96*** -3.54*** -3.54***
(-7.03) (-8.43) (-6.24) (-6.92) (-4.61) (-3.13) (-3.13)
Population growth -0.22 -0.25* 0.029 -0.38* -0.43 0.074 0.074
(-1.44) (-1.66) (0.12) (-1.65) (-1.44) (0.082) (0.082)
Investment (in % of GDP) 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.034 0.034
(9.26) (9.14) (5.67) (5.63) (3.39) (0.43) (0.43)
Openness (in % of GDP) 0.0041** 0.0038* 0.010*** 0.0073*** 0.0056* -0.025 -0.025
(2.09) (1.90) (4.08) (2.83) (1.84) (-1.08) (-1.08)
Years of schooling 0.099*
(1.66)
Terms of trade growth 5.26 6.41* 9.13 22.4 22.4
(1.16) (1.92) (1.62) (1.29) (1.29)
Output loss 0.68 0.97 0.037 0.037
(0.85) (1.24) (0.017) (0.017)
Legal system quality index 0.12 0.26 1.21* 1.21*
(1.07) (1.44) (1.88) (1.88)
Freedom of trade index 0.23** 0.45** 1.77** 1.77**
(2.19) (2.41) (2.32) (2.32)
Regulation quality index 0.11 -0.13 0.16 0.16
(0.56) (-0.49) (0.22) (0.22)
NMS (dummy) -0.54 -0.59 -0.65 -0.50 -5.41**
(-0.63) (-0.73) (-0.72) (-0.23) (-2.40)
NMS during 1990-1994 (dummy) -2.97** -1.13 -0.88 -4.90**
(-2.27) (-0.70) (-0.50) (-2.23)
NMS during 1995-1999 (dummy) 4.90**
(2.23)
NMS during 2000-2004 (dummy) 2.82*** 2.65*** 2.95*** -0.72 4.19
(2.72) (2.71) (2.90) (-0.34) (1.60)
NMS after 2005 (dummy) 2.15** 1.78** 2.01** -0.69 4.21
(2.44) (2.07) (2.23) (-0.34) (1.50)
Observations 406 406 455 351 208 51 51
Adjusted R-squared 0.557 0.555 0.457 0.493 0.464 0.595 0.595
Notes: Estimation method: OLS. t statistics are reported in parentheses. The panel
structure employs non-overlapping ￿ve-year periods. *, **, *** denote statistical signif-
icance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent level, using robust standard errors. Column (1) displays
standard textbook speci￿cation, column (2) repeates the same regression excluding the
schooling variable but using the same sample as (1). All speci￿cations include world
region dummies, time period dummies (1995-1999 period omitted), and the interaction
between the two set of dummies. World regions are de￿ned as follows: OMS (omitted),
NMS, non-EU OECD, non-EU non-OECD; in column (6), the reference group to the
NMS dummy are the remaining transition economies. In column (7), the 1990-1994
period is omitted.
21Table 2: Addressing the possible endogeneity of the investment variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Maximum time period Full Post-1990 Full Post-1990 Full Post-1990
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Log initial GDP per capita -2.11*** -1.94*** -2.27*** -2.17*** -2.05*** -1.94***
(-7.02) (-4.51) (-7.32) (-4.80) (-7.53) (-4.88)
Population growth -0.54** -0.65** -0.58** -0.63** -0.53** -0.64**
(-2.25) (-2.11) (-2.44) (-2.11) (-2.41) (-2.23)
Initial investment (in % of GDP) 0.072*** 0.044*
(3.66) (1.74)
Relative price of investment -0.013*** -0.012**
(-3.27) (-2.29)
Investment (instrumented) 0.084*** 0.051*
(4.04) (1.93)
Openness (in % of GDP) 0.0088*** 0.0069** 0.011*** 0.0090*** 0.0085*** 0.0069**
(3.23) (2.17) (4.12) (2.92) (3.40) (2.33)
Terms of trade growth 5.97* 7.53 5.27 9.47 5.53* 7.25
(1.75) (1.39) (1.38) (1.63) (1.78) (1.45)
Output loss 1.42* 1.80** 1.90** 1.95*** 1.31* 1.72**
(1.80) (2.36) (2.41) (2.61) (1.80) (2.45)
Legal system quality index 0.18 0.33* 0.18 0.30 0.17 0.32*
(1.44) (1.80) (1.35) (1.55) (1.49) (1.90)
Freedom of trade index 0.22** 0.40** 0.13 0.31 0.20** 0.40**
(1.99) (2.19) (1.15) (1.65) (2.02) (2.37)
Regulation quality index 0.086 -0.18 0.072 -0.17 0.083 -0.17
(0.43) (-0.65) (0.37) (-0.67) (0.45) (-0.67)
NMS (dummy) -0.93 -0.98 -0.87 -0.89 -0.93 -1.00
(-1.06) (-1.03) (-1.05) (-0.99) (-1.18) (-1.15)
NMS during 1990-1994 (dummy) -0.59 -0.25 -1.27 -1.00 -0.51 -0.19
(-0.31) (-0.12) (-0.75) (-0.54) (-0.29) (-0.10)
NMS during 2000-2004 (dummy) 2.71*** 3.04*** 2.65*** 2.94*** 2.71*** 3.03***
(2.68) (2.92) (2.77) (2.94) (2.98) (3.20)
NMS after 2005 (dummy) 1.72* 2.00** 1.85** 2.12** 1.92** 2.15**
(1.87) (2.09) (2.09) (2.31) (2.29) (2.44)
Observations 350 207 350 207 349 206
Adjusted R-squared 0.437 0.425 0.433 0.436 0.480 0.450
First-stage IV estimation
Relative price of investment -0.016*** -0.013***
(-4.40) (-2.68)
Initial investment (in % of GDP) 0.82*** 0.84***
(27.50) (19.71)
Kleinbergen-Paap F statistic 661.38 357.62
Stock-Yogo 10% critical value 19.93 19.93
Notes: OLS (columns 1-4), IV (columns 5-6). See also notes to Table 1.
22Table 3: IV regressions with interaction terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Full Transition Full Transition Full Transition
Estimation method IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS
Log initial GDP per capita -1.67*** -2.34** -2.02*** -3.28*** -1.81*** -1.88
(-7.18) (-2.43) (-7.38) (-2.86) (-6.57) (-1.22)
Population growth -0.47** 0.36 -0.51** 0.31 -0.37* 0.068
(-2.12) (0.40) (-2.27) (0.36) (-1.85) (0.052)
Investment (in % of GDP, 0.089*** 0.076 0.086*** 0.057 0.085*** 0.094
instrumented in case of IV) (4.23) (0.95) (4.09) (0.70) (4.15) (0.93)
Openness (in % of GDP) 0.0083*** -0.023 0.0084*** -0.024 0.0090*** -0.0068
(3.31) (-1.11) (3.36) (-1.05) (4.24) (-0.27)
Terms of trade growth 5.43* 19.6 5.45* 19.8 8.80** 40.4**
(1.75) (1.14) (1.76) (1.12) (2.37) (2.41)
Output loss 1.30* -0.63 1.31* -0.50 0.46 0.48
(1.80) (-0.29) (1.81) (-0.22) (0.47) (0.12)
Private credit (in % of GDP) -0.19* 1.02
(-1.91) (0.63)
Legal system quality index 0.18 1.51** 0.30 2.59** 0.18 0.61
(1.56) (2.46) (1.54) (2.32) (1.58) (0.91)
Freedom of trade index 0.22** 2.03*** 0.21** 2.02** 0.17 1.46
(2.15) (2.78) (2.08) (2.68) (1.57) (1.53)
Regulation quality index 0.045 -0.28 0.073 -0.0084 0.025 -0.25
(0.25) (-0.38) (0.39) (-0.012) (0.15) (-0.46)
NMS (dummy) -0.80 -1.27 -0.87 -1.19 -0.59 -0.94
(-1.01) (-0.59) (-1.10) (-0.55) (-0.76) (-0.48)
NMS during 1990-1994 (dummy) -0.56 -4.65** -0.53 -4.26** 0.14
(-0.33) (-2.26) (-0.31) (-2.08) (0.083)
NMS during 2000-2004 (dummy) 2.78*** -0.72 2.16** -1.75 -1.44 -4.04*
(3.32) (-0.35) (2.18) (-0.77) (-1.63) (-2.08)
NMS after 2005 (dummy) 1.94** -0.45 1.92** -0.57 1.31 1.08
(2.31) (-0.22) (2.29) (-0.28) (1.50) (0.67)
(NMS 2000-04)*(log initial GDP per capita) -2.89*** -4.28**
(-4.00) (-2.44)
(NMS 2000-04)*(legal system quality) -1.74* -3.24*
(-1.71) (-1.85)
(NMS 2000-04)*(private credit ratio) -5.72*** -7.76**
(-6.14) (-2.76)
Observations 349 51 349 51 320 37
Adjusted R-squared 0.488 0.632 0.481 0.608 0.478 0.614
First-stage IV estimation
Relative price of investment -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(-4.40) (-4.39) (-3.99)
Initial investment (in % of GDP) 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.82***
(27.05) (27.08) (23.11)
Kleinbergen-Paap F statistic 642.47 647.44 552.36
Stock-Yogo 10% critical value 19.93 19.93 19.93
Notes: OLS (columns 1, 3 and 5), IV (columns 2, 4 and 6). See also notes to tables
1 and 2.
23Annex
Details on data sources and variable de￿nitions
￿ Growth in real GDP per capita (%). Source: World Development Indicators.
￿ Initial real GDP per capita (PPP): value recorded in the ￿rst year of each
￿ve-year periods Source: Penn World Tables.
￿ Population growth (%). Source: Would Development Indicators
￿ Openness: sum of imports and exports on GDP (%). Source: Penn World
Tables.
￿ Years of schooling: average years of schooling across whole population. Source:
Barro and Lee.
￿ Terms of trade growth (%). Source: World Development Indicators.
￿ Quality of legal system: index computed by Fraser Institute summarising ele-
ments of legal system and property rights protection.
￿ Freedom of trade: index computed by Fraser Institute summarising information
on tari⁄ and non tari⁄ barriers and capital movement controls.
￿ Quality of regulation: index computed by Fraser Institute summarising ele-
ments (including the extent of public versus private ownership) of regulations a⁄ecting
labour, product, and ￿nancial markets.
24Table A.1: Further robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method OLS OLS IV IV
Log initial GDP per capita -2.20*** -2.15*** -2.15*** -2.21***
(-6.91) (-4.78) (-7.64) (-5.64)
Population growth (initial values) -0.38* -0.46*
(-1.93) (-1.82)
Investment ratio (initial values) 0.087*** 0.066**
(4.29) (2.49)
Openness ratio (initial values) 0.0083*** 0.0065*
(2.98) (1.96)
Terms of trade growth (initial values) 3.96** 7.74***
(2.21) (2.90)
Output loss (initial values) 0.41 0.83
(0.44) (0.98)
Population growth -0.42* -0.52*
(-1.79) (-1.67)
Investment ratio 0.100*** 0.073**
(4.50) (2.54)
Openness ratio 0.0087*** 0.0073**
(3.29) (2.28)
Terms of trade growth 14.8** 22.1***
(2.22) (2.72)
Output loss 0.30 0.58
(0.34) (0.70)
Legal system quality index 0.19 0.39** 0.20* 0.37**
(1.47) (2.22) (1.83) (2.41)
Freedom of trade index 0.25** 0.45** 0.18* 0.46**
(2.13) (2.33) (1.66) (2.51)
Regulation quality index 0.034 -0.29 0.071 -0.26
(0.16) (-1.01) (0.36) (-0.97)
NMS (dummy) -1.08 -1.16 -1.12 -1.33
(-1.20) (-1.21) (-1.34) (-1.44)
NMS during 1990-1994 (dummy) 1.07 1.66 1.08 1.86
(0.49) (0.69) (0.51) (0.79)
NMS during 2000-2004 (dummy) 3.02*** 3.34*** 2.88*** 3.20***
(2.87) (3.10) (3.03) (3.23)
NMS after 2005 (dummy) 2.15** 2.53** 2.24** 2.54***
(2.27) (2.58) (2.56) (2.75)
Maximum time period 1960-2009 1990-2009 1960-2009 1990-2009
Observations 340 200 341 201
Adjusted R-squared 0.446 0.448 0.474 0.436
First-stage IV estimation
Relative price of investment -0.02*** -0.01**
(-4.32) (-2.33)
Investment ratio (initial values) 0.83*** 0.86***
(28.47) (21.07)
Openness ratio (initial values) 0.99*** 0.99***
(78.55) (65.79)
Terms of trade growth (initial values) 0.27*** 0.34***
(6.93) (6.90)
Output loss (initial values) 1.07*** 1.06***
(25.10) (24.29)
Kleinbergen-Paap F statistic 9.94 9.93
Notes: OLS (columns 1-2), IV (columns 3-4). See also notes to table 2.
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